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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
EXECUTORS

AND

TENURE-WVHETHER

ADMINISTRATORS-APPOINTMENT,

QUALIFICATION

AND

OR NOT A TESTATOR MAY, BY WILL, DELEGATE TO AN-

OTHER THE POWER AND AUTHORITY

OF NOMINATING

His EXECUToR-The

Supreme Court of Montana recently had occasion to decide a relatively
rare question when it considered the appeal taken in the case of In re
Effertz' Estate.' The testatrix there concerned had, by her will, directed
that the judge of probate should appoint the nominee of the Roman
1-

Mont. -,

207 P. (2d) 1151 (1949).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Great Falls, Montana, to act as executor of her last will and testament. In accordance therewith, the Bishop
nominated the appellant to act as executor. The nominee duly and regularly filed his petition for probate and requested that letters testamentary
be issued to him. The trial court ordered that the documents which purported to be the last will and testament should be admitted to probate
as such but, instead of appointing the appellant as the sole executor,
it appointed the appellant and another as joint administrators with the
will annexed and issued letters of administration accordingly.
The
nominee appealed, contending that the trial court had erred in its ruling
that administration with the will annexed was proper because of the failure
of the testatrix to name an executor in the will. When reversing that
decision, the Montana Supreme Court, after a thorough discussion of the
law, by holding that the appellant should have been appointed sole executor of the estate, followed what appears to be a well-settled common law
doctrine on the subject.
The issue involved presents a problem of historical as well as legal
significance. At least one authority considers that the issue arose for
the first time during the reign of Henry VI, when wills as such were
not permitted but were accepted as testaments dealing with goods and
other chattel property. In his treatise on the general subject of executors and administrators, Sir Edward Vaughn Williams notes that Katherine, Queen Dowager of England, mother of Henry VI, made a last will
and testament wherein she constituted the King as her sole executor. His
Majesty, possibly concerned with affairs of state, thereupon appointed
three noblemen to act in that capacity.2 His right so to do, of course,
would hardly be questioned by a court during that period of monarchical
supremacy.
Insofar as ordinary persons are concerned, the English ecclesiastical
courts have adhered to a doctrine, possibly stemming from that precedent,
which permits the delegation of authority over the decedent's estate. Evidence thereof may be found in the case of In the Goods of Cringan,3
a case which has been noted by some legal scholars as being the earliest
authority on the present issue.4 The testator there concerned had directed that the legatees should mutually appoint two intelligent and trustworthy persons to execute his testamentary plan. The legatees did so
nominate two persons to serve as executors and, when affirming the ap2 See Williams, A Treatise on the Law of Executors and Administrators (R. H.
Small, Philadelphia, 1832), Vol. 1, p. 113.
3 1 Hag. Ecc. 548, 162 Eng. Rep. 673 (1828).
4 Alexander, Commentaries on the Law of Wills, Vol. 3, § 1221; Schouler, Wills,
Executors and Administrators, 6th Ed., Vol. 3, § 1515.
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pointment, the judge said: "The provision in this will, as to the appointment of executors, I am informed, is not very unusual in Scotland . . .
However, understanding from the deputy registrar that instances have
frequently occurred of granting probate to persons nominated by those
authorized by the testator so to nominate, I shall allow this decree to
pass as prayed." ' 5 Since then, the rule that a testator may delegate to
a person or persons named in his will the power and authority of nominating his executor for him has been uniformly followed in England.'
In 1875, the English rule appears to have been introduced into this
country through the medium of the decision in the New York case of
Hartnett v. Wandell.7 In that case, the testator had nominated and appointed his wife as the executrix of his estate but had requested that
such male friend as she might desire should be appointed with her, to act
as co-executor. Upon proper compliance with this provision, the court,
in a most scholarly and elaborate consideration and discussion of the
law, held that the issuance of letters testamentary to the widow and her
nominee was valid and proper. The doctrine thus applied has been uniformly followed whenever the question has arisen, so it may be said that
the issue seems to be unanimously settled in the United States, as well. 8
Courts have primarily based these decisions on the well-established
principle that the intention of the testator should prevail unless it should
be contrary to some law or public policy.9 For that reason, they have
5 1 Hag. Ecc. 548 at 549, 162 Eng. Rep. 673 at 673-4.
GFarnum v. Administrator General, 14 App. Cas. 651 (1889); In the Matter of
Ryder, 2 Sw. & Tr. 127, 164 Eng. Rep. 941 (1861) ; Jackson v. Paulet, 2 Rob. Ecc.
344, 163 Eng. Rep. 1340 (1851); In the Goods of Deichman, 3 Curt. 123, 163 Eng.
Rep. 676 (1842). That view has also been followed in Canada: Wright v. Stackhouse, 10 N. B. R. 450 (1863).
7 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875).
8 Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923) ; Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo.
25, 129 P. 210 (1912) ; Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888) ; Kinney v.
Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131 (1898) ; Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind. 471, 51 N. E.
913 (1898) ; In re Stahl's Estate, 113 Ind. App. 29, 44 N. E. (2d) 529 (1942);
Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678, 77 N. W. 263 (1898) ; In re Crosby's Estate, 218
Minn. 149, 15 N. W. (2d) 501 (1944) ; Landon v. Huitfeldt, 41 N. J. Eq. 267, 3 A.
882 (1886) ; Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N. J. Eq. 68, 6 A. 609 (1886) ; In re Bergdorf's
Will, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912) ; Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am.
Rep. 194 (1875) ; In re Griffin's Estate, 193 Misc. 419, 83 N. Y. S. (2d) 579 (1948) ;
In re Walsh's Will, 147 Misc. 281, 264 N. Y. S. 72 (1933) ; In re Brocato's Estate,
143 Misc. 664, 258 N. Y. S. 111 (1931) ; State v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 198, 37
P. (2d) 209 (1934) ; Cole v. City of Watertown, 119 Wis. 133, 96 N. W. 538 (1903).
Textual material on the subject may be found in Alexander, Commentaries on the
Law of Wills, Vol. 3, § 1221; Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators, 6th
Ed., Vol. 3, § 1515; Williams, Executors, 12th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 132; Woerner, Administrators, 3rd Ed., § 229. Encyclopedic treatment is provided by 33 C. J. S., Executors
and Administrators, § 22c; 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 57, and 11
R. C. L. § 18. See also 60 Alb. L. J. 141.
9 Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923); Tuckerman v. Currier, 54
Colo. 25, 129 P. 210 (1912); Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888);
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shown great liberality in the exercise of committing the execution of a
will to the party therein intended by the testator to act as executor. 10
It cannot be contradicted that the testator is in the most advantageous
position to know how, when and by whom his estate should be administered. To disregard the intention of the testator would, without doubt,
lead to violence and disharmony with respect to the interpretation of
the scheme employed by the testator, for a well-considered method of distribution could easily fail if executed by a total stranger.
Similarly, it can only be supposed that good reason would exist in
the mind of a testator who makes no present designation of his executor.
The person whom he might have appointed may refuse or be unable to
act, or may die before the purposes set forth in the will have been properly effectuated. If he chooses to trust to the judgment of one whom
he has authorized to make the selection for him, the confidence that he
has reposed in such other. person should not be disturbed by the courts.
In recognition of this fact, courts have consistently allowed the delegation of authority to appoint an executor even where statutory material
is present which might easily have been interpreted to prohibit it. In
Thomas v. Field," for example, the testatrix empowered her two daughters
to appoint her executor and, in compliance with such authority, the daughters nominated another person to act as such. It was urged, by those
opposing the appointment, that the statutory provision which empowered the court to appoint a "named" executor 2 prevented the designation
of anyone not specifically referred to by name in the will. A unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, validating the right to such
a delegated appointment, held that the common law power to delegate
Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Il. 449, 50 N. E. 131 (1898) ; In re Crosby's Estate, 218
Minn. 149, 15 N. W. (2d) 501 (1944) ; In re Bergdorf's Will, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E.
714 (1912). That view is also iterated in the earlier New York cases cited in note 8,
ante.
1o Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131 (1898); Hartnett v. Wandell,
60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875) ; State v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 198, 37 P.
(2d) 209 (1934).
11 210 Al-h. 502. CS S,). 474 (1923). See also Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449,
50 N. E. 131 (1898) ; In re Crosby's Estate, 218 Minn. 149, 15 N. W. (2d) 501
(1944); Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875).
The last
mentioned case overruled the holding in In re Bronson's Will, Tucker's Rep. 464
(N. Y., 1869), which appears to be the only case holding that the common law
doctrine had been abrogated by a statute which required that the executor be named
in the will, even though the statute did not expressly purport to nullify the common
law principle.
12 Ala. Code, 1907, § 2507, then in force, declared: "Whenever a will has been
admitted to probate in this state, the judge of the court in which the will was
probated may issue letters testamentary, according to the provisions of this chapter,
to the persons named as the executors in such will, if they are fit persons to serve
as such." See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 227.
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had not been abrogated by the statute in the absence of an express provision so declaring.
After it has been determined that such a power of appointment does
exist, two questions will immediately arise, to-wit: (1) to whom may
this power of appointment be given, and (2) what restrictions, if any,
are placed upon the person exercising the power ? As to the first, courts
have been extremely liberal with respect to the person who may be given
such a power of appointment. They have allowed the power to rest in
disinterested third persons, such as the judge of probate, 3 as well as
in persons directly interested in the estate, such as the legatees. 4
Research has failed to uncover any decision which points specifically
to qualifications which may be required either of the person making the
appointment or of the appointee. Naturally, the power might be circumcribed by the testator, who might limit the authority to a selection between members of a designated class. If unlimited authority is conferred,
it must be remembered that specific statutory provisions exist which impose qualifications on the person to be appointed as executor."5
Obviously, the estate should always be administered by a trustworthy
and competent individual, so it would be safe to say that no nominee would
secure appointment if he lacked the qualifications required by law, despite the fact that he might be the designate of the person possessing
the power of appointment. Conversely, as public policy has found it
necessary to enact statutes denying to certain individuals the right to act
as executors, it would seem to follow therefrom that much the same restrictions might be applicable to the one empowered to appoint as apply
to the appointee. Logically, a party who is personally qualified to act
as an executor would, without doubt, choose a more competent person to
execute the will than would a person not possessed of such acceptable
moral and mental capabilities. Up to the present, however, that question
has apparently never arisen. Generally, the person given the power to
appoint may exercise it quite freely, subject to the only requirement that
the person nominated to act as executor be a suitable person.'"
This,
13 Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888) ; Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678,
77 N. W. 263 (1898).
'4 Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923) ; Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind.
471, 51 N. E. 913 (1898).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 229, for illustration, specifies that a person
is not qualified to act as executor of any will who is "of unsound mind or an
adjudged incompetent under this Act or has been convicted of a crime rendering
him infamous or is a non-resident of this State or, if a male, is less than eighteen
years of age."
16 Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678, 77 N. W. 263 (1898). The will there in question
placed a specific limitation to that effect.
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of course, allows great leeway in the making of a choice, so it is not surthat the appointer
prising to learn that there is one decision which holds
17
may even exercise the authority in favor of himself.
It would appear, then, that the instant case has not only been correctly
decided but is sustained by such an overwhelming weight of authority,
supported by such satisfactory and logical reasoning, that a contrary decision would not only have been a surprising one but would have been both
unjust and impracticable.

W. E.

INFANTS--ACTIONS-WHETHER

OR NOT

A

CAUSE OF ACTION

KASKE

EXISTS

IT-Two
decisions, recently handed down by the highest courts of Ohio and Minnesota, revive interest in the question of the right of an infant to maintain
an action for prenatal injuries. In the first, that of Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc.,1 a complaint filed by the infant's next friend charged
that the child's mother, then seven months pregnant, had been injured
through the negligence of the transportation company at a time when she
alighted from one of its vehicles, which injury induced a premature birth
and permanent damage to the minor plaintiff. The trial court sustained
a general demurrer to the complaint but, upon appeal, the intermediate
appellate court reversed the judgment, 2 after which the record was cerThat tribunal held that a viable
tified to the Supreme Court of Ohio.'
child, injured while still in the mother's womb, could maintain a subsequent action against the wrongdoer. In the second case, that of Verkennes
v. Corniea,4 a father brought an action for an alleged wrongful death of
his unborn child. It appeared that the wife had entered a hospital for
purpose of confinement and delivery but, due to the alleged negligence of
the attending physician, both she and the child died. A demurrer based
on the ground that no cause of action had accrued, since the child had,
in fact, never existed as a person in being, was sustained by the trial
court. Again, on appeal, the decision was reversed, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota deciding that an infant which was capable of independent
IN FAVOR OF A CHILD FOR PRENATAL INJURIES

INFLICTED UPON

17 In the Matter of Ryder, 2 Sw. & Tr. 127, 164 Eng. Rep. 941 (1861).
1 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. (2d) 334 (1949).
2 82 Ohio App. 445, 82 N. E. (2d) 423 (1948).
3 Certification occurred because the judges of the Court of Appeals, although
unanimous in their opinion, noted a conflict with a judgment pronounced, on the
same question, in the case of Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N. E. (2d) 421 (Ohio App.,
1943).
Minn. -, 38 N. W. (2d) 838 (1949).
4-
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existence, even though as yet unborn, was to be deemed a living being in
contemplation of law.
In both the cases cited, the defendant had rested on the theory generally relied upon by the majority of courts which deny a recovery, viz.,
that an unborn child is not a person in being and therefore no cause
of action can accrue to it for injuries occasioned during the period when
it is still being carried by its mother.6 This proposition appears to have
stemmed from the case of Dietrich, Administrator v. Inhabitants of North
Hampton,7 the initial decision in this country. In that case, a premature
birth was induced when the mother slipped upon a defect in the highway
of the defendant town. The child was not directly injured but, due to
the fact that it was not in an advanced stage of development, the mother
being only five months pregnant, it did not survive. An action for
wrongful death was instituted by the administrator but the court denied recovery. Thereafter, a majority of the American jurisdictions took
the position that, so long as the injury occurred at any time before the
birth of the infant, no subsequent suit could be maintained, either by the
child or in its behalf.'
It has been urged from several quarters, however, that later courts
have failed to evaluate the decision in the Dietrich case properly.'
The
court there specifically pointed out that the child involved was, at the
time of the accident, incapable of independent existence outside the body
of the mother and was, therefore, not viable.' ° It might logically be argued
that the decision therein stands for no more than the proposition that a
foetus which is not advanced to the stage where it can survive outside
the mother is not a person in being. As such, it could not claim legal
rights which belong to persons nor recover for injuries suffered while
5 Right to maintain a wrongful death action, stemming from the determination
that the child itself could have sued had it lived, rested upon Minn. Stat. Ann.

1947, § 573.02. That statute provides that "when death is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of any person or corporation, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain an action therefor if he might have maintained an action,
had he lived, for an injury caused by the same act or omission."
6 See, for example, Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts. R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. S.
367 (1913), noted in 26 Harv. L. Rev. 638.
7 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
s See cases cited in note 11, post. Some of them rest directly on the Dietrich case:

Jordan v. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944 (1935);
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. 455, 26 A. (2d) 489 (1942).

) See the dissenting opinion of Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill.
359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900), as well as the opinion in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-K ENT LAW REVIEW 162.
10 As to the medical basis for a distinction between an "embryo" and a "viable
foetus," see Am. Illus. Med. Dict., 19th Ed., pp. 483 and 1605. An embryo is a
foetus in its earliest stage of development, typically during the first three months
of pregnncy; a viable foetus is one that can live outside the utera.
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en ventre sa mere. Courts which have relied upon that case for support
in denying recovery for all prenatal injuries, regardless of the stage of
the foetal development, may well have strayed from the actual rule of the
decision therein.
Despite this, a majority of jurisdictions continue to deny to the infant any right of recovery under the stated circumstances, 1 and so great
is this weight of precedent that courts have accepted it as a strict rule
of the common law to be followed without deviation. 1 2 A refusal to
adopt any other position, regardless of the obvious harshness of the rule,
is generally attributed to a reluctance to engage in judicial legislation.
One court, at least, has stated that it is the duty of the legislature to
create the right and, until such is an accomplished fact, it will not permit
recovery for a prenatal injury. 3 In that regard, it is interesting to note
that judicial interpretation of a California statute, 1 4 not too specific in
character, has cleared the way for the maintenance of the action in that
state,'1 5 which holding may be indicative of the eagerness with which courts
may be likely to accept such legislation and do their utmost to construe
it favorably.
Without waiting for legislation on the subject, a minority view has
been developing, to which the two cases mentioned above must now be
added, a view which would allow a child to recover for injuries inflicted
on it while en ventre sa mere."6 It is the theory of these cases that a
1 Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 176 (1900) ; Smith v. Luckhardt, 229 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. (2d) 446 (1939),
noted in 27 Ill. B. J. 348, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1016: Dietrich v. Northampton, 138
Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884) ; Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274
N. W. 710 (1937) ; Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71, Ann. Cas.
1914C 613, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625 (1931) ; Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. 455, 26 A.
(2d) 489 (1942) ; Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated Trans. Co., 18 N. J. Misc. 429,
14 A. (2d) 52 (1940) ; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, 20 A. L. R.
1503 (1921), noted in 34 Harv. L. Rev. 549; In re Roberts Estate, 158 Misc. 698,
286 N. Y. S. 476 (1936) ; Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N. E. (2d) 421 (Ohio App., 1943) ;
Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., Inc., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. (2d) 28 (1940); Gorman v.
Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 A. 704, 55 L. R. A. 118, 91 Am. St. Rep. 629 (1901) ; H. P.
Jordan v. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944, 97
A. L. R. 1513 (1935) ; Nelson v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 41 S. W.
1021, 11 L. R. A. 391, 22 Am. St. Rep. 81 (1890) ; Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co.,
177 S. W. (2d) 350 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943) ; Lipp v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
See also Walker v.
Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916, L. R. A. 1917B 334 (1916).
Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (1890).
12 Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated Trans. Co., 18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. (2d)
52 (1940).
13 Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 50, 274 N. W. 710 (1937).
14 Deering, Cal. Civ. Code, § 29.
15 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 93 P. (2d) 562 (1939).
16 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1940); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.
(2d) 629, 93 P. (2d) 562 (1939) ; Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. (2d) 352 (La. App.,
1923) ; Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 227, 97 A. L. R. 1525 (1924). See
also Montreal Tramway v. Le Veille, 4 D. L. R. 337 (1933).
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child which is capable of independent existence, although still within the
body of the mother, should be considered as a person in being, hence
entitled to recover for injuries which may be suffered by it at that time.' 7
These opinions are quick to point out the status the unborn infant enjoys in the fields of property law and criminal law. As to the former, a
child still carried by its mother, provided it is later born alive, is considered as in esse for every purpose which will benefit it.' In the contemplation of the latter, for purpose of punishing the destruction of a child,
a foetus is recognized as a living being after it has quickened or stirred
in the womb.'" There then follows the logical query, "why a part of the
mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in
that of property and crime ?" 2° It has, if viable, its own bodily form and
members, manifests all of the anatomical characteristics of individuality,
possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capable now of being ushered into the visible world. Why not, then, its own
separate legal personality as well?
These courts, using an approach to tort law similar to that used in
the branches of property and criminal law, would supply the final arc
to round out the legal circle of logic. They deny that there is any common-law rule which bars recovery for prenatal injuries and, when confronted with the Dietrich decision, point to the fact that the child there
concerned was not viable at the time of the accident. This emphasis on
viability is strengthened by the fact that, in all of the prior minority
cases, the child was eventually born alive, while three of the decisions make
specific reference to this fact. 2 1 Only in the Minnesota case noted above
has recognition been accorded to the possibility of recovery despite the
fact that the child was not born alive.
To that extent, the Minnesota case pushes the limits of the minority
17

Lamont, J., in Montreal Tramway v. Le Veille, 4 D. L. R. 337 at 344 (1933),

expressed the belief that it was "but natural justice that a child, if born alive and
viable, should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrongfully committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother." In Kine v.
Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 229, 97 A. L. R. 1525 (1924), the court proceeded
on the novel approach that the tortfeasor had set a harmful force in motion which
did not mature or have its effect until the infant was born. The time elapsing in
the interim between the infliction of the harm and birth was said to have no effect
on the cause of the injury, except as it might have evidential value in terms of
cause and effect.
15 Villar v. Gilbey, (1907) A. C. 139, Harper v. Archer, 4 Smedes & Marshall 99,
43 Am. Dec. 472 (Miss., 1845) ; Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35, 21 Am. Dec.
66 (New York, 1830).
19 State v. Cooper, 2 Zabriskie 52 (N. J., 1849).
20 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 140 (1940).
21 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1940) ; Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist. &
Co. Rep. 227, 97 A. L. R. 1525 (1924) ; Montreal Tramway v. Le Veille, 4 D. L. R.
337 (1933).
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rule beyond the bounds of any prior decision and tends to unsettle the
whole movement for it neglects the one fundamental requirement of the
law of property on which the argument depends for its validity. It also
poses another objection in that new and confusing problems of damage
law are projected. Except as to identifiable costs of interment 2 2 by
what measuring rod may the jury determine damage in the case of a
child never actually born as a person? A jury can determine the degree
of injury to a living child and can project that degree of injury into the
future to ascertain the present worth of the future harm growing from
defendant's neglect. To attempt the same thing with respect that that
which never existed, borders on speculation so gross as to be apt to
produce an unfavorable reaction toward a developing minority view, one
more in need of encouragement than discouragement.
M. J. BARAZ

LANDLORD AND TENANT-RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BY
LANDLORD-WHETHER
IN

A CO-OPERATIVE

OWNER OF

A PROPRIETARY

LEASE TO

APARTMENT

APARTMENT BUILDING IS TO BE DEEMED A LANDLORD

UNDER THE FEDERAL HOUSING AND RENT ACT OF 1947-An Illinois re-

viewing court has now, for the first time, been called upon to determine
whether a purchaser of stock and of a proprietary lease, issued by a cooperative housing corporation, is to be deemed to be a "landlord" within
the meaning and intent of the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947.'
That issue, presented in the case of Kenny v. Thompson,2 grew out of a
record which disclosed that one Dr. Bokman had originally owned shares
of stock in a certain building corporation and occupied an apartment in
the building under a proprietary lease from the corporation. He later
subleased the apartment to the defendant who rented on a month to
month basis. Some years later, and at a time when the federal statute
aforementioned was in effect, Dr. Bokman sold his stock and assigned
his proprietary lease to the plaintiff. Desiring the apartment for his personal occupancy, the plaintiff gave proper notice and brought a forcible
detainer action when the defendant refused to vacate. The statute in question prohibited eviction by a landlord, even though the tenant's lease
had expired, so long as the tenant continued to meet certain of the obligations of his tenancy, but an exception therein authorized eviction where
22 The Illinois Injuries Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, now permits

the recovery of certain itemized expenses, including funeral bills, where the decedent
leaves no widow or next of kin.
1 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 1881 et seq.
2 338 Il. App. 403, 87 N. E. (2d) 229 (1949).
3 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 1899(a).
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the landlord sought, in good faith, to recover possession for his immediate and personal use and occupancy. 4 The trial court, apparently believing that the plaintiff did not qualify as a landlord within the exception noted, gave judgment for the defendant but that judgment was reversed on appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois.
It is clear that, were it not for the prohibitions of the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, the plaintiff in the instant case would be entitled
to judgment for a local statute merely requires that the plaintiff in a
forcible entry and detainer proceeding be a person entitled to possession.5
The first question, then, is to determine what additional requirements, if
any, are imposed by the federal act. It should be noted that Section
1899(a) thereof prohibits eviction by a "landlord," although creating
an exception in his favor where he seeks possession for his personal occupancy.6 If the plaintiff is deemed not to be a landlord within the meaning
of the federal statute, as the trial court held, then it would seem to follow
that the statute would not apply to him at all, thereby leaving him free
to exercise the rights he always enjoyed under state statute or by common law. Clearly, if the plaintiff did not qualify under the exception
to the prohibition, then he could not come under the prohibition itself
for, by sheer logical construction, the word "landlord" should be given
the same meaning in one part of the section as it possesses in another.
The upper court, therefore, was faced with two alternatives.
It
could either rule that the plaintiff was not a landlord, that the federal
act was inapplicable, and that he was free to maintain his action under the state statute; or it could hold that he was a landlord, that the
act did apply, but that he was entitled to possession under the exception. In either event, the plaintiff would have to prevail, but a reversal
based on the first alternative would lay down the undesirable precedent
that none of the restrictive provisions of the Housing and Rent Act apply
to tenants holding proprietary leases in co-operative units. The court
did, in fact, follow the second course by endeavoring to show that a cooperative participant was in effect the "owner" of the apartment he
occupied, hence could easily qualify as a landlord. For the purpose of
this discussion, then, it is necessary to determine whether the Appellate
Court was correct in holding that a co-operative member is such an
owner.
4 Ibid., § 1899(a) (2).

5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 2, permits "the person entitled to possession
of lands or tenements" to be restored thereto, "when any lessee of the lands or
tenements, or any person holding under him, holds possession without right after
the determination of the lease or tenancy by its own limitation, condition, or terms,
or by notice to quit or otherwise."
6 It should be noted that the term "landlord" is nowhere defined in the federal
statute.
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A knowledge of the basic elements of the co-operative scheme is, of
course, essential to a general understanding of the problem. 7
According to the usual plan, a corporation is formed to purchase or construct
an apartment building in which each member selects an apartment which
he may occupy exclusively as a home. For convenience, the fee title
to the property is placed in the corporation, while the corporate management is controlled by the stockholders through a board of directors. The
two important instruments in the organization are the stock certificate
and the proprietary lease, which are inseparable at all times. A prospective member must purchase a certificate for a specified number of shares
roughly equivalent to the value of his apartment. This certificate entitles him to a proprietary lease, ordinarily of the long term or perpetual
type, which is evidence of his right to occupy and control a particular
apartment and sets out the respective rights and duties of lessor and
lessee. Monthly assessments are paid by each member in proportion to
his stock holdings. The corporation reserves the right to terminate the
lease for any default or violation of any covenant by the lessee. Assignment of stock and lease may be made only with consent of the directors
or by majority vote of the stockholders.
Before examining these elements in further detail, an inquiry into
the real purpose behind the co-operative plan should furnish the best
clue to the problem of ownership. The rapid growth of co-operative apartments in recent years must be attributed primarily to the fact that they
provide an opportunity for one to own his apartment. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the very essence of the co-operative plan lies
in its design to appeal to those who desire to own, rather than merely
rent, living space. It has been repeatedly held that tenant stockholders
are concerned primarily in the purchase of a home, and that the permanency of the individual occupants as tenant owners is an essential
element in the general plan. 8 Further advantages lie in the fact that
each tenant owner has a voice in the selection of other tenants and in the
management of the property so that, through the principle of co-operation, the common expenses of operation and maintenance of the property
as a whole may be shared by the owners. These factors, however, are
but the practical machinery for carrying on the main purpose of ownership and are designed to operate for the protection of the purchaser's
investment.
7 See MacChesney, The Principles of Real Estate Law (The Macmillan Co., New
York, 1928), Ch. 8. See also Castle, "Legal Phases of Co-operative Buildings," 2 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1928), and notes in 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. 532 and 3 Int. L. Rev. 131.
s Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N. Y. S. (2d)
854 (1939), followed in 1165 Fifth Avenue Corporation v. Alger, 261 App. Div. 608,
26 N. Y. S. (2d) 671 (1941), and in Tompkins v. Hale, 172 Misc. 1071, 15 N. Y. S.
(2d) 854 (1939).
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Perhaps most often cited as being inconsistent with the thought of
ownership is the fact that legal title to the premises rests in the corporation. A realistic approach should reveal that this seeming inconsistency is a matter of form rather than one of substance. Such an approach
requires first a consideration of the alternatives that might have been
adopted. If separate deeds to each apartment were used, the objectives
of co-operation would be almost impossible to attain, evils of speculation
would be apt to arise, and there would be practical difficulties of separate insurance and tax assessment. If, on the other hand, the entire
building were to be held by the owners as joint tenants, the four unities
of time, title, interest, and possession would be impossible of achievement,
and the operation of the principle of survivorship would lead to undesirable results. Tenancy in common, would be open to even more objections. Therefore, as a California case once stated, "in order to effect a
co-operative plan whereby each member might in effect own his own
apartment, and yet be subject to such rules and regulations as a majority
should deem wise and expedient, and also be subject to a sale of the
property when two-thirds of the members should so vote, it was apparently deemed necessary to lodge title in an artificial person, the corporation. '"9 That court concluded that, while the corporation held legal title,
yet to all intents and purposes, the entire equitable estate was distributed proportionately among the owner-tenants. Thus it is apparent that
the corporation, serving as a convenient repository agency in this respect,
is merely the best available means of accomplishing desired objectives and
is not truly inconsistent with the prime object of tenant ownership.
In addition, the large initial outlay made by each member for his
stock has been properly termed the "capital investment" 1 of an amount
which is the ordinary equivalent of the market value of the apartment.
Use of that term is hardly to be explained unless the purchaser is to
gain "ownership" of an apartment thereby, particularly when it is recalled that co-operative apartment corporations are essentially non-profit
in character so the stockholder cannot expect that any dividends would
be paid on his investment.
It has been urged that the proprietary lease is similar to an ordinary
lease, one which creates a relationship of landlord and tenant in no way
different from that created by any standard lease for a residential apartment. 11 The advocates for this position point out first that the monthly
9 In re Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 185 at 188, 22 P. (2d) 694 at 696 (1933).
10 See Tudor Arms Apartments v. Shaffer, 62 A. (2d) 346 (Md. Ct. of App., 1947).
11 Marks, "Coercive Aspects of Housing Cooperatives," 42 Ill. L. Ev. 728 (1948),
particularly p. 736. See also Braislin, Porter & Baldwin v. Sawdon, 68 N. Y. S. (2d)
774 (1946). But see contra: Curtis v. LeMay, 186 Misc. 853, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 768
(1.945).
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assessments paid by each member are actually a form of "rent."
In
the ordinary and legal sense of the word, "rent" signifies a profit or
reasonable return to the landlord for the use of property.1 2 Assessments
under a proprietary lease, however, are made for the sole purpose of
covering the operating expenses, maintenance, taxes, insurance, and payments on corporate indebtedness, 3 without thought of any general profit
to the corporation. It has also been urged, as an indication that the
holder of the proprietary lease is nothing more than a tenant, that certain house rules which govern his conduct and the cleanliness, safety,
and care of the apartment are appended to his lease with attendant penalties for the violation thereof. Such rules simply round out the principle of co-operation and cannot seriously be said to conflict with ownership. A large residential building is plainly not adaptable to the unrestricted use of each apartment for, without some type of regulation,
few would care to live therein. To the same end are limitations against
structural change, against transfer of the tenant's interest and against
sub-letting; all of which usually require the securing of approval from
the board of directors or at least from a majority of the stockholders.
These provisions, while restrictive in a sense, really serve to increase the
value of the tenant's connection with the corporation by giving him a
voice in matters of vital interest, particularly when the failure of any
tenant to sustain his share of the common burden would increase the
burden of the others. The option given to the corporation to terminate
the tenancy upon default or for other violation of the lease is the only
logical and practical method for enforcing its terms.
Aside from the foregoing restraints, the co-operative participant is
accorded privileges which place the proprietary lease beyond the scope
14
of an ordinary lease. Some of these were pointed out in Hicks v. Bigelow,
one of the few leading cases in this field. That opinion stated, in definite
terms, that the purchaser of a co-operative apartment is more than a
mere tenant or lessee for he enjoys certain proprietary rights which a
mere tenant lacks, rights which have most of the attributes of ownership. These rights include a voice in the management and operation of
the building, in the selection or approval of other tenants, in the vital
matter of any proposed sale or mortgage of the property, but above all
in the exclusive, personal right to occupy a particular apartment. The
12 Black, Law Dict., 3d Ed., p. 1529.
13 The co-operative principle, treating the shareholder as the essential owner, is
recognized by 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(z), which permits the tenant to deduct his proportionate share of the real estate taxes and interest on indebtedness, chargeable
to the corporation, from his personal income tax return.
14 55 A. (2d) 924 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C., 1947).
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court might well have added that these rights normally extend over a
period of time far longer than that of the usual apartment lease, often
for the life of the corporation itself. Conversely, even in a long-term
lease of standard character, the lessor grants few covenants beyond the
one of quiet enjoyment whereas the corporation, under the proprietary
lease, in addition to the matters already mentioned, customarily covenants to maintain a first class apartment building, to furnish services, to
execute all repairs with diligence, to keep books of account, to render
annual statements to the tenant, and to keep the building properly insured. Finally, in the event of a sale of the property or of a termination of an individual lease, the corporate lessor is obliged to account to
the lessee for his proportionate share of the proceeds in the first instance,
or the full proceeds upon resale of his apartment in the second instance.15
Clearly, then, these features distinguish the proprietary lease from the
standard arrangement between the average landlord and tenant.
In surveying all these incidents, not only of the proprietary lease,
but of the co-operative organization as a whole, two thoughts suggest
themselves. First, those incidents which do restrict the tenant's rights
of ownership were placed there by the tenant owners themselves, who
control the government of the enterprise. Secondly, while there may be
seeming inconsistencies in the matter of tenant ownership, they are not
truly inconsistent when focused in the light of the overall plan, a plan
that is not perfectly adapted to its ends but is none the less a remarkable combination of available legal devices. The conclusion to be drawn
from this analysis of the problem seems to be a fairly justifiable one that
a purchaser of stock and of a proprietary lease from a co-operative housing corporation should be treated as a landlord within the meaning of
the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, so as to be able to evict a
holdover tenant. The ruling in the instant case, then, appears to be in
line with what small weight of authority there is on the subject.
H. M. Ross, JR.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SERvICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER NONSTRIKING UNION OFFICE WORKERS ARE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT
PENSATION

BENEFITS

WHEN

AN

AFFILIATED

FACTORY

WORKERS'

COMUNION

ESTABISHMIENT--In the recent Illinois
case of Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Company v. Gordon,' the
CALLS A STRIKE IN THE SAME

15 The by-laws of the corporation may provide for the deduction of expenses involved in reselling the apartment and of any indebtedness owed by the lessee to
the corporation.
See McCullough, "Co-operative Apartments in Illinois," 26
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 303 (1948), particularly pp. 313-4.
1 403 Ill. 523, 87 N. E. (2d) 610 (1949).
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Supreme Court of Illinois, under a set of facts novel to this state, has
clarified the rights of employees to unemployment compensation when
they become unemployed because of a labor dispute. The claimants in that
case were members of an office workers' union which was an affiliate of a
union of factory workers in the same plant. The affiliation agreement
provided that the office union could not enter into contract negotiations
without the approval of the factory union and required the former union
to contribute one-fourth of its dues to the latter. Both groups of workers entered into contract negotiations with the employer, the office employees being represented therein by officers of the factory union, and a
satisfactory agreement was reached as to the office workers.
The employer failed to come to terms as to the factory employees and a strike
of the latter followed, resulting in a picket line through which only a
few maintenance men were permitted to pass. There was testimony that
the employer, desiring to avoid violence, kept the plant gates locked
thereby preventing the office workers from entering or attempting to
enter the premises had they so desired. Claims advanced by the office
workers for unemployment compensation benefits during the period of
the strike were denied by a deputy examiner on the theory that such
workers were participating in or at least were interested in the strike,
but the claims were granted on appeal to the Director. The allowance
of compensation was affirmed by both the circuit court and by the Illinois
Supreme Court.
Legislation calling for unemployment compensation originated in
England, but the first English statute provided that all employees whose
unemployment was the product of a labor dispute were to be disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits. 2 The unfairness of this disqualification, at least as it bore on those who had no interest in the dispute
and had not participated therein, became soon apparent and, four years
later, the English statute was amended. 3 As amended, it permitted those
who became unemployed as a result of a labor dispute to draw unemployment compensation benefits provided they neither participated in,
were directly interested in, nor financed the dispute and were not of the
same grade or class of workers as those who were directly concerned.
Following congressional enactment of the Social Security Act, 4 all
of the American states, as well as the territories, adopted unemployment
compensation laws.'
Nine states have enacted blanket disqualification
210-11 Geo. V, c. 30, § 8(1).
3 See 14-15 Geo. V, c. 30, § 4(1).
4 49 Stat. 635, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1102.
5 The state acts have followed, to a great extent, a bill drawn by the Social
Security Board.
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clauses similar to the original English statute6 but the remaining fortytwo states and territories imposed disqualification clauses substantially
similar to the amended English provision. 7 Typical of the latter is the
Illinois enactment which, in substance, requires the claimant to show
absence of participation, of financing, of direct interest in the labor dispute as well as membership in a different grade or class in order to be
eligible for benefits." As the claimants in the instant case admittedly were
unemployed because of a labor dispute, 9 it became necessary for them to
show that they came within the noted exception to the disqualification
clause in order to receive payment of the benefit provided by law.
The issue of participation was decided on the basis that since the
claimants were prevented from obtaining entrance to the plant by virtue
of the locked gates, their failure to work did not constitute a participation in the strike.' 0 This reasoning may be said to be in line with holdings from the majority of jurisdictions which have passed on the question. Whether the particular act could be said to be voluntary or in6 Ala. Code Ann. 1945, Tit. 26, § 214(A); Cal. Gen. Laws, Cum. Supp. 1945, Act
8780(d), §56A; Del. Laws 1937, Ch. 258, § 5(d) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, §341.360(1) ;
Minn. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 268.09(1) (6) ; New York, Labor Law, § 592(1) ; Ohio Gen.
Code Ann. 1948, § 1345-6d; Utah Code Ann., Cum. Supp. 1949, § 42-2a-5d; Wis. Stats.
1947, § 108.04(10).
7 Alaska, Comp. Laws Ann. 1949, § 51-5-4(d) ; Ariz. Code Ann. 1947, § 56-1005(d);
Ark. Dig. Stat., 1944 Cum. Supp., § 1089; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1947, Ch. 167A, § 5d;
Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, § 7508(3); D. C. Code, Cum. Supp. 1948, Ch. 46, § 310(f) ;
Fla. Stats. 1945, § 443.06(4) ; Ga. Code Ann., 1947 Cure. Supp., § 54-610(d) ; Hawaii
Rev. Laws 1945, Ch. 74, § 4231(d) ; Ida. Code Ann. 1949, § 72-1366(j) ; Iowa Code
1946, § 96.5(4) ; Kans. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 44-706(d) ; La. Gen. Stat. Ann., Cum.
Supp. 1949, § 4434.4(d) ; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Ch. 24, § 5(d) ; Md. Ann. Code 1947,
Art. 95A, § 5(e) ; Mass. Ann. Laws 1942, Ch. 151A, § 25(b) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. 1947,
§ 17.531(b) ; Miss. Code Ann. 1943, § 7379(d); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Cum. Supp.
1948, § 9431(11) (a); Mont. Rev. Code 1941, Tit. 87-106(d) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1947,
§ 48-628(d) ; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. 1945, § 2825.05(d) ; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch.
218, § 4D; N. J. Stat. Ann. 1949, § 43:21-5(d) ; N. Mex. Stat. Ann. 1941, § 57-805(d) ;
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 96-14(d) ; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 52-0602; Okla. Stat.
1949, Tit. 40, § 215(d) ; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1947, § 126-705(d) ; Pa. Stat. Ann.,
Cum. Supp. 1948, Tit. 43, § 802(d) ; R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 284, § 7(4); S. C.
Code Ann. 1942, § 7035-82(d) ; S. D. Code 1939, § 17-0830(4); Tenn. Code Ann.,
Cum. Supp. 1948, § 6901.29E; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 1949, Art. 5221, sub. b-3(d) ;
Vt. Rev. Stat. 1947, § 5379-IV; Va. Code Ann. 1942, § 1887(97) (d); Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann., 1945 supp., § 9998-215; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, § 2366(78); Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 1945, § 54-105(B) (II).
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 223(d).
9 As to whether or not a labor dispute exists, see Am. Steel Foundries v. Gordon,

404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 (1949) ; Bankston Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon,

399 Ill. 291, 77 N. R. (2d) 670 (1948) ; Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N. E. (2d)
294 (1947); Adkins v. Indiana Employment Security Division, 117 Ind. App. 132,
70 N. E. (2d) 31 (1946) ; Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Board
of Review, 165 Pa. Super. 385, 68 A. (2d) 393 (1949) ; In re Deep River Timber Co.,
8 Wash. (2d) 580, 110 P. (2d) 877 (1941). See also notes in 26 CHICAOO-KFNT LAW
REVIEW 180 and 36 Ill. B. J. 364.
10 Where blanket disqualification does not exist, proof of absence of participation

is necessary: see statutes cited in note 7, ante.
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voluntary has, in general, been made the criterion of determining whether
the employees participated in the dispute. An outright refusal to work
would obviously constitute participation. Similarly, a sympathy strike,
wherein one union refuses to work in order to support another striking
union, produces voluntary unemployment. 1 A failure to cross a picket
line established by the striking employees has been productive of much
dispute but has generally led to the result that a voluntary failure to
cross has been held to constitute participation in the dispute. 12 Where
"fear of physical violence" has been found present, however, the failure
to cross the picket line has been deemed to be involuntary in character
with the result that such employees have been classed as non-participants
in the strike.' 3 There must be more than a mere "theatrical threat" of
violence so the fear of "being photographed, '"" and the fear of "union
consequences'"" have been held insufficient to render the refusal to cross
involuntary.
The issue of participation because of affiliation has also arisen prior
to the present case but, unlike the holding therein, it has been held, on
slightly different circumstances, that the close relationship between the
two groups was sufficient to make the one a participant in the labor dispute of the other. In the case of Burns v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,' 8 two local unions, whose members worked in the same
establishment, were affiliates of the same national union but only one of
the locals had called the strike. The members of the other local were
11 Aitken v. Board of Review of Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 136 N. J. L. 372,
56 A. (2d) 587 (1948) ; Drylie v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 152 Pa.
Super. 211, 56 A. (2d) 272 (1948); Barnas v. Unemployment Comp. Board of

Review, 152 Pa. Super. 429, 33 A. (2d) 258 (1943).
12 The result in California may be attributable to the blanket disqualification

adopted by the state: McKinley v. Calif. Employment Stabilization Comm'n, - Cal.
(2d) -, 209 P. (2d) 602 (1949) ; Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Same, 24 Cal. (2d) 735,
151 P. (2d) 224 (1944) ; Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Same, 24 Cal. (2d) 695, 151 P.
(2d) 202 (1944); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Same, 17 Cal. (2d) 321, 109 P. (2d) 595
(1941). No such blanket disqualification is involved in Baldassarius v. Egan, 135
Conn. 695, 68 A. (2d) 120 (1949) ; Brown v. Maryland Unemp. Comp. Bd., 189 Md.
250, 55 A. (2d) 696 (1947) ; Meyer v. Indus. Comm'n of Mo. - Mo. -, 223 S. W.
(2d) 835 (1949); McGann v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379,
62 A. (2d) 90 (1948); Phillips v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 374,
62 A. (2d) 84 (1948); Appeal of Employees of Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. (2d)
659, 198 P. (2d) 675 (1948) ; Andreas v. Bates, 14 Wash. (2d) 322, 128 P. (2d) 300
(1942) ; In re Deep River Timber Co., 8 Wash. (2d) 179, 111 P. (2d) 575 (1941) ;
In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. (2d) 580, 110 P. (2d) 877 (1941).

Only one case has reached a contrary result: State v. Ruth Coal Co., -

W. Va.

-,

56 S. E. (2d) 549 (1949).

13 Steamship Trade Assoc. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Davis, -

Md. -,

57 A. (2d) 818

(1948).

14 Appeal of Employees of Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. (2d) 659, 198 P. (2d)
675 (1948).
15 Stillman Unempl. Comp. Case, 161 Pa. Super. 569, 56 A. (2d) 380 (1948).
16 164 Pa. Super. 470, 65 A. (2d) 445 (1949).
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denied benefits on the basis of the reasoning that the suspension was
voluntary in that (1) the national union had approved the strike, and (2)
there was some basis for inferring that the action of the national was
assented to by the non-striking local. Such reasoning would appear to
be an extension of the sphere of voluntary action beyond its natural
orbit, so it is not surprising that it was not followed by the Illinois
court in the instant case. Absence of participation, however, would not
be enough to escape disqualification for other requirements must also
be met.
When faced with the problem of determining whether the office
workers' union in the instant case was disqualified because it had financed
the factory union, the Illinois court declared that the fact that a portion of the dues collected had reached the treasury of the factory union
was, in itself, insufficient to constitute financing. The office union received supplies and stationery in return for the small amount of money
so paid and no additional or special assistance was rendered to the
striking union. Again, most jurisdictions which have passed upon the
question have reached the conclusion that the payment of dues alone does
not amount to a financing of the labor dispute. Three state legislatures
have specifically so provided,17 and at least one court has required other
active financial aid in addition to the payment of dues before disqualification may be found present.18 The membership of a local in a national organization has, however, been held sufficient in and of itself
to constitute a financing of any striking local within the national organization on the theory that the non-striking local may be said to have
a proprietary interest in the dues which it has contributed to the national, particularly if those funds have been used to aid the striking
local. 19 Reasoning of that type is not generally followed, was not discussed by the Illinois Supreme Court in the instant case, and would
appear to be contrary to the present trend on the point. The presence
of a combination of statutes providing that the payment of dues is not
to be considered financing, together with ten other statutes which have
eliminated the necessity of proving an absence of financing to support
a claim of eligibility for benefits,'2 indicates a trend away from that
view.

2

1

17Fla. Stat. 1945, § 443.06(4); Mass. Ann. Laws 1942, Ch. 151A, § 25(b); Mich.
Stat. Ann. 1947, § 17.531(b).
is Aitken v. Bd. of Review of Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 136 N. J. L. 372, 56 A. (2d)
587 (1948).
19 See Copen v.Hix, 130 W. Va. 343, 43 S. E. (2d) 382 (1947).
20 See the statutes of Alaska, Dist. of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. References thereto are
set forth in note 7, ante.
21 See note in 49 Col. L. Rev. 550.
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In passing upon the issue of direct interest,22 the Illinois court decided that the members of the office union were not directly interested
in the dispute as no wage increase or other benefit could accrue to them,
regardless of the result of the dispute between the factory workers and
the company, for their contract had already been negotiated. That conclusion is also in conformity with the view followed in a majority of
the other jurisdictions for they require that the working conditions of
the employee must be subject to an adverse or favorable outcome before
he can be said to be directly interested in the dispute. 2 Thus it has been
24
his hours, 25
held that interest is present where the employee's wages,
the steward or the seniority system 28 will be affected by the result of the
strike, even though the employee may be personally opposed to the strike
and may have voted against it.27 Following this reasoning, at least two
jurisdictions have held that where a single union is the bargaining agency
which represents all employees, all are disqualified if the union calls
a strike despite the fact that the claimants themselves are not union
members. 28 An implied assent to the strike on behalf of the non-union
minority has been found present on the theory that, as the union is the
22 Each of the forty-two states and territories which provide any exception to the
principle of disqualification require proof of the absence of direct interest: note 7,
ante.
23 Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S. E. (2d) 863 (1941) ; Auker v. Review
Board, 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N. E. (2d) 629 (1947); Kemiel v. Review Board, 117
Ind. App. 357, 72 N. E. (2d) 238 (1947); Chrysler Corp. v. Appeal Bd. of Mich.
Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 301 Mich. 351, 3 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942) ; Chrysler Corp. v.
Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87 (1941) ; Unemp. Comp. Comm'n v. Lunceford,
229 N. C. 570, 50 S. E. (2d) 497 (1948).
24 Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S. E. (2d) 863 (1941).
25 Chrysler Corp. v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 301 Mich. 351,
3 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942); Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87
(1941).
26 Nobes v. Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 313 Mich. 472, 21 N. W. (2d) 820 (1946).
27 The recent case of Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 IlL. 484, 87 N. E. (2d)
625 (1949), seems to have adopted this line of reasoning. Eighteen key workers
there went on a "wildcat" strike against the wishes of their union which had been
Eventually, all
made the certified bargaining agent for all of the employees.
workers were laid off when the entire plant had to be closed down because of the
resulting bottleneck. All employees, except the striking eighteen, filed claims for
unemployment compensation but were denied benefits. The court held that as the
employer was subjected to economic pressure from the entire group, without being
able to negotiate with the few who were dissatisfied and who constituted an
essential link in the whole operation, all were ineligible even though they may
personally have opposed the strike. The logic dictating such a decision is obvious.
If the result were otherwise, it would be possible for a union to pull out a key
group of employees and tie up the plant yet have the remaining employees draw
unemployment compensation and relieve the union of the considerable financial
strain of a strike. The enhancement thus afforded to its bargaining position would

be obvious.
28 Auker v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N. E. (2d) 629 (1947) ; Kemiel
v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 357, 72 N. E. (2d) 238 (1947) ; Appeals of Employees of Polson Lumber Co., 19 Wash. (2d) 467, 143 P. (2d) 316 (1943).
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sole bargaining agency for all employees, all will benefit if the strike
should be successful. Narrow interpretation of the phrase "directly interested" has been given in three jurisdictions which would limit disqualification only to those "creating the dispute or participating therein
in order to enforce their demands. ' '25 So narrow an interpretation is
obviously open to criticism on the ground of a confusion between the
phrase "directly interested" on the one hand and the phrase "participating in" on the other. They are not synonymous and the legislature, by
enacting two different requirements for exemption, obviously intended
they should be different and mutually exclusive.
On the last point, the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the office workers were of a different grade or class than the factory workers
not only because of the difference in their duties but also because of the
fact that each group had a separate union contract with the employer.
The phrase "grade or class" has been made the subject of widely conflicting interpretations. 3 ° At one extreme, may be found cases which
have held that all workers in the plant are of the same group or class,
either because one bargaining agency represented all"' or because all were
engaged in a "continuous integrated process, as semi-skilled workers
with similar wages. '"32 Other cases divide workers into "cohesive groups
acting in concert," thereby serving to place all non-union workers into
one group and union workers in a different class. 33 Perhaps the most
logical division is one which distinguishes production workers from maintenance workers or permits of separation by departments.34 Under this
view, the type of work done becomes the determining factor,3 5 so the
separation of office workers from factory workers affords a sound foundation for the Illinois holding.
While it may be said that the case under discussion presents nothing
29 Dept. of Indus. Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 78, 1 So. (2d) 395 (1941) ;
Kieckhefer Container Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 125 N. J. L. 155, 13 A.
(2d) 648 (1940) ; Wickland v. Commissioners, 18 Wash. (2d) 206, 138 P. (2d) 876
(1943).
30 Only three states possessing an exceptions clause do not require the petitioning
workers to prove that they are not of the same grade or class as those who have
participated in the labor dispute. They are Louisiana, Rhode Island and Vermont.
31 Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Indus. Comm'n, 104 Utah 242,
139 P. (2d) 208 (1943).
32 Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S. C. 315, 20 S. E. (2d) 865 (1942).
33 Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc., 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S. W. (2d) 1 (1946); Copen
v. Hix, 130 W. Va. 343, 43 S. E. (2d) 382 (1947).
34 See Nordling v. Ford Motors Co., Minn. -, 42 N. W. (2d) 576 (1950), as to
what constitutes a "department" of the employer for this purpose.
35 Kieckhefer Container Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 125 N. J. L. 155,
13 A. (2d) 648 (1940) ; Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Marlen, 228 N. C. 277,
45 S.E. (2d) 385 (1947).
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of novel significance when it is evaluated in the light of decisions from
other jurisdictions, and has not resulted in any new or different interpretation of a commonly found statute, yet the decision possesses noteworthy interest because of the way in which it does pin-point the features which should control the right to unemployment compensation
benefits.
K. J. DOUGLAS
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HIBITION OF OBSCENITY STATUTEs-In People v. Strassner, the Court of

Appeals of New York was called upon to deal with a problem of statutory
construction which, as yet, has been undetermined' by the highest court
of any other state having analogous statutory provisions. The problem
presented was whether or not a phonograph record came within a statutory prohibition against the sale or possession of obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy or indecent matter. The defendant was convicted on an information which charged a violation of a state statute2 in that he possessed a
filthy, indecent and disgusting phonograph record. His conviction was
reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the specific enumeration of obscene articles in the first clause of the statute, 3 articles whose
obscenity could be communicated by visual representation, as well as any
general phraseology therein,4 was inadequate to condemn the instrumentality which formed the basis of defendant's prosecution since his material called for auditory representation accomplished by mechanical
means.
The case under discussion accurately points up a problem dealing
with the interpretation to be given to various state statutes relating to
obscenity, which interpretation may determine whether or not said statutes are sufficient to embody phonograph records as articles or instruments
of indecent or immoral use or purpose, so as to punish the possession
thereof. The magnitude of the problem is made the more evident by the
fact that only two states have, by express provision, made the trafficking
1 299 N. Y. 325, 87 N. E. (2d) 280 (1949).
2 McKinney, Consol. Laws Ann., Vol. 39, Part 1, Art. 106, § 1141.
3 See note 2, ante. Specific reference is there made to "any obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent, or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
story paper, writing, paper, picture, drawing, photograph, figure or image."
4 The statute concluded with the words "...
or any written or printed matter of
an indecent character."
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A number of
in obscene phonograph records specifically punishable.5
other statutes, by confining their language to specific enumerations of
species,6 none of which can be said to include phonograph records, will
obviously require legislative amendment before the ills of obscene phonograph records can be adequately coped with. The balance, because they
contain general phrases of ambiguous terminology, will require judicial
interpretation as a preface to any determination of whether or not they
possess the means of inhibiting the exploitation of smut accomplished by
the production and sale of obscene phonograph records. A reading thereof
discloses certain common similarities which will admit them to categorical
analysis. For the purpose of this study, such method will be employed.
First, a majority of these states possess statutes which, after specifically enumerating certain species of obscene articles, follow such speAlthough the wording of the
cific enumeration with a general phrase.'
general phrases found in this group of statutes does differ, they do possess
similarity in that each is introduced by words such as "or any," "or
other," or "or any other," and then follows some generic term which
might be claimed to be sufficiently broad to include a phonograph record
within its definition. No fair and reasonable meaning given to the items
in the specifically enumerated species could include a phonograph record
therein. If such records are to be classified as punishable obscenity thereunder it must be because such objects are found to lie within the generic
terms contained in the general clauses. The issue, then, becomes one as
to just how far a court may go, when subjecting these general phrases
to interpretation.
5 Deering Cal. Penal Code 1949, Tit. 9, Ch. 8, § 311; Mass. Ann. Laws 1933, Vol. 9,
Ch. 272, § 28, as amended.
6 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 14, Ch. 64, §§ 372-4; Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, Ch. 43, § 3002;
Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, Tit. 41, § 2704; Ga. Code 1933, Ch. 26, § 6301, as amended by
Laws 1941, p. 358; Hawaii Rev. Laws 1945, Tit. 30, Ch. 242, § 11107; Ida. Code 1947,
Vol. 4, Tit. 18, § 4101; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1939, Vol. 13, Oh. 31, Art. 8, § 4660;
Mont. Rev. Code 1947, Vol. 8, Tit. 94, Ch. 36, § 94-3603; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942,
Vol. 2, Ch. 441, § 14; N. Mex. Stats. Ann. 1941, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 1812; Okla. Stats.
Ann. 1936, Tit. 21, Ch. 36, § 1021; S. D. Code 1939, Vol. 1, Tit. 13, Ch. 13.17,
§ 13.1722; Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 7, Tit. 1, Ch. 9, § 11190; Vernon's
Tex. Penal Code Ann. 1925, Vol. 1, Tit. 10, Ch. 7, Arts. 526-7, as amended; Utah
Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 1, Tit. 15, Ch. 8, § 41.
7 Fla. Stats. 1941, Tit. 44, Ch. 847, § 847.01; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 2, Ch. 725,
§ 725.5; Dart's La. Crim. Law and Pro. Code 1943, Ch. 3, § 740-106; Me. Rev. Stat.
1944, Vol. 2, Ch. 121, § 24; Md. Ann. Code 1939, Vol. 1, Art. 27, § 495; Mich. Stats.
Ann. 1936, Vol. 25, Ch. 286(a), § 28.575; Minn. Stats. Ann. 1945, Vol. 40, Ch. 617,
§ 617.24(i) ; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, Vol. 2, Ch. 1, § 2288; Neb. Rev. Stats. 1943, Vol. 2,
Ch. 28, Art. 9, § 28-921; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, Vol. 5, Ch. 14, § 10144; N. J. Stats.
Ann. (Perm. Ed.) 1937, Tit. 2, Ch. 140, § 2; N. C. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 14,
§ 14-189; Ore. Comp. Laws 1940, Vol. 3, Tit. 23, Ch. 9, § 23-924; R. I. Gen. Laws
1938, Ch. 610, § 13; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 1443; Vt. Stats. 1947, Ch. 70,
Tit. 41, § 8490; Va. Code 1942, Ch. 183, § 2459; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, Ch. 61,
§ 6066; Wis. Stats. 1947, Vol. 2, Tit. 32, Ch. 351, § 351.38.
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The production of obscene phonograph records being a matter of rather
recent innovation in the field of lewd practices, it is not surprising that
there exists a minimum of judicial decisions dealing with the point. Two
cases do serve to underscore the basic problem. In the reported case,
the New York Court of Appeals, faced with interpreting the general phrase
"or any written or printed matter," was not content to rest its decision solely upon the obvious ground that the adjectives "printed" and
"written," by themselves, operated to exclude from the general phrase
an instrumentality which could hardly be contended to be either a "writing" or a "printing" as those terms are currently understood. Instead, the court also pointed out that the several items in the specifically
enumerated species all served to address their obscenity to the mind
through the sense of sight. It is this latter observation which indicates
the feature which is common to all the varied items specifically enumerated in the statutes here under consideration. This common characteristic should be kept in mind, as attention shifts from one category of
statutes to another, in order that the resultant effect thereof upon the
general phrases therein contained may be best appreciated.
Citing as authority for the position taken by them, the New York
Court of Appeals referred to the holding in Alpers v. United States.'
That case concerned an appeal taken from a conviction on two counts
of an information charging the appellant with knowingly depositing with
a carrier, for transportation in interstate commerce, certain lewd and
indecent phonograph records. It was the theory of the government's
case that such acts constituted a violation of a federal code provision
on the subject.9 Judge Orr, writing an opinion which reversed the conviction, there stated that, as penal statutes must be strictly construed, the
rule ejusdem generis became particularly applicable when the phrase
presented was a general one which followed a specifically enumerated class
of persons or things. He was of the opinion that a search of the legislative history of the code provision justified the restriction of the general phrase "or other matter of an indecent character," as found therein,
to species of articles like those enumerated and whose obscenity is communicated to the mind by the sense of sight. This decision serves to supply
another observation which will be particularly pertinent to those concerned with the problem of interpretation and that is the rule ejusdem
generis may prove helpful.
That rule, although variously defined, is generally accepted to be
that where, in a statute, general words follow a particular designation of
8175 F. (2d) 137 (1949).
9 18 U. S. C. A. § 396. The section is now numbered § 1462.
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persons or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be
presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designation
and as including only persons or things of the same kind, class, character
or nature as those specifically designated. 10 It is said to be based upon
the obvious reason that if the legislature had intended the general words
to be used in an unrestricted sense, no mention would have been made of
the particular classes. 1 Under that rule, as applied to statutes falling in
the first class, obscene phonograph records could not be found to lie
within the general phrases because not within the genus whose enumerated
species have the common characteristic of communicating their obscenity
by the sense of sight alone.
At this point, it is significant to note that the decision in the case of
Alpers v. Umnited States, 2 cited as authoritative basis for the decision in
the instant case, was later reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States 3 in an opinion rendered subsequent to that filed in the New York
case. The majority of that court arrived at a different conclusion both as
to the application of the rule ejusdem generis and also as to the legislative intention which might be gathered from the context of the act. Justice
Minton, writing the majority decision which reinstated the conviction of
the defendant, declared that the obvious purpose of the legislation under
consideration was "to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from
being used to disseminate any matter that, in its essential nature, communicates obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy ideas." He noted that Congress had legislated "with respect to a number of evils in addition to those
10 The widespread acceptance of that definition may be noted in such holdings as
Goode v. Tylor, 237 Ala. 106, 186 So. 129 (1939); Bell v. Vaughn, 46 Ariz. 515,
53 P. (2d) 61 (1936) ; People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. (2d) 880, 156 P. (2d) 7 (1945);
Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 137 P. (2d) 690 (1943) ; State v. Certain Contraceptive Materials, 126 Conn. 428, 11 A. (2d) 863 (1940); Dunham v. State, 140
Fla. 754, 192 So. 324 (1940); Beavers v. LeSeuer, 188 Ga. 393, 3 S. E. (2d) 667
(1939) ; State v. Gardner, 174 Iowa 748, 156 N. W. 747 (1916) ; Bullman v. City of
Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 10 N. E. (2d) 961 (1937); Dowd v. Sullivan, 217 Ind. 196,
27 N. E. (2d) 82 (1940) ; State v. Miller, 90 Kans. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913) ; Federal
Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 244 Ky. 338, 94 S. W. (2d) 645 (1936) ; State v. Texas
Co., 205 La. 217, 17 So. (2d) 569 (1944) ; American Ice Co. v. Fitshugh, 128 Md.
382, 97 A. 999 (1916) ; People v. Powell, 280 Mich. 699, 274 N. W. 372 (1937);
School Dist. No. 30 v. Consol. School Dist. No. 30, 151 Minn. 52, 185 N. W. 961
(1921) ; State v. Russell, 185 Miss. 13, 187 So. 540 (1939) ; Zinn v. City of Steelville, 351 Mo. 413, 173 S. W. (2d) 398 (1943); Mancuso v. State, 123 Neb. 204,
242 N. W. 430 (1932) ; State v. Craig, 176 N. C. 740, 97 S. E. 400 (1918) ; Ganstad
v. Nygaard, Sheriff, 64 N. D. 785, 256 N. W. 230 (1934) ; In re Frietag's Estate,
165 Ore. 427, 107 P. (2d) 978 (1941) ; In re Fredirick's Estate, 333 Pa. 327, 5 A.
(2d) 91 (1939) ; State v. Hollock, 114 Vt. 292, 44 A. (2d) 326 (1945) ; State v.
Eberhart, 106 Wash. 222, 179 P. 853 (1919). These cases do not necessarily deal
with the subject of obscenity.
11 See State v. Campbell, 76 Iowa 122, 40 N. W. 100 (1888).
12175 F. (2d) 137 (1949).
1'5- U. S. -, 70 S.Ct. 352, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 353 (1950).
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prescribed by the portion of the statute under which respondent was
charged." As statutes were to be construed with their entire context in
mind, he believed that a comprehensive statute should not be "constricted
by a mechanical rule of construction."14

What then is the conclusion to be drawn from the reviewed decisions ?
It is believed by this writer that the general phrases in the first category
of statutes will be subjected to interpretation pursuant to the rule of
ejusdem generis, and the general words "or any," "or other," or "or any
other," will be read as if stated in the form of "other such like." ' 15 The
reasons for this conclusion are several. First, the rule has been universally employed in ascertaining legislative intention where general words
follow the specific enumeration of classes of persons or things. Second,
almost all of the states here concerned recognize and admit the existence
of the rule, either applying or denying it application as the facts of each
case dictate.' 6 Third, the rule is the most consistent one which might be
applied when the statute is one requiring strict construction.17 Finally,
the United States Supreme Court decision in the Alpers case, although
stating a limitation often expressed to exist,' 8 is distinguishable from the
situation presented by statutes in this first category for the federal code
provision, unlike the state provisions, enumerate articles whose obscenity
is not confined to communication or transmission by the sense of sight.
As it enumerates other articles whose obscenity comes into existence only
when employed for a particular use or purpose, not being obscene per se
merely by presentation to one's sight, the problems are not identical. The
conclusion, therefore, most consistent with well established principles of
statutory construction when bearing in mind the strict interpretation
usually given to penal statutes, is that phonograph records of the type in
U. S. - at -, 70 S. Ct. 352 at 354, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 353 at 355.
15 Hodgson v. Mountain & Gulf Oil Co., 297 F. 269 (1924); State v. Campbell,
76 Iowa 122, 40 N. W. 100 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46, 30 Am.
Rep. 652 (1878) ; Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N. W. 31 (1898).
16 See cases cited in note 10, ante.
17 First National Bank v. United States, 206 F. 374 (1913) ; People v. Thomas,
25 Cal. (2d) 880, 156 P. (2d) 7 (1945) ; Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 137 P.
(2d) 690 (1943) ; Ex parte Muckenfuss, 52 Tex. Cr. 467, 107 S. W. 1131 (1908);
State v. Goodrich, 84 Wis. 359, 54 N. W. 577 (1893).
18 Helvering v. Stockholme Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed.
211 (1934) ; Martin v. State, 156 Ala. 89, 47 So. 104 (1908) ; State v. Gallagher,
101 Ark. 593, 143 S. W. 98 (1912) ; Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600, 99 P. 333 (1900) ;
City of Chicago v. N. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753 (1910) ; State v.
Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913) ; Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508, 42 N. W. 481
(1889) ; State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 242, 135 S. W. 465 (1911) ; Burk v. Montana Power
Co., 79 Mont. 52, 255 P. 337 (1927) ; Dillard v. State, 104 Neb. 209, 175 N. W. 668
(1920); People v. Kaye, 212 N. Y. 407, 106 N. E. 122 (1914); Klingensmith v.
Siegal, 57 N. D. 768, 224 N. W. 680 (1929) ; Vassey v. Spake, 83 S. C. 566, 65 S. E.
825 (1909) ; State v. Bridges, 19 Wash. 431, 53 P. 545 (1898).
14-
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question are to be excluded from things regarded as punishable obscenity,
at least until statutory modification occurs.
Passing now to a consideration of those statutes which fall within the
second category,19 it will be noticed that these statutes similarly contain
a specific enumeration of obscene articles which address their obscenity to
the mind through the sense of sight but, following this specific enumeration, are two general phrases. The first is similar to that involved in the
reported New York case. It is followed by another which describes "or
any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purpose." Too
close identity between the last mentioned phrase and that frequently
appearing in the first category of statutes might erroneously lead a court
to apply the decision of the New York case. If this second phrase were
missing, statutes in this category would be directly analogous to the one
treated there and it would be proper to assume that the general phrase
"or other engraved, printed, or written matter" would exhaust all other
species not specifically enumerated and falling within the genus of engraved, printed, or written matter.
But, with the exhaustion of that genus, i.e. things appealing to sight,
the second phrase, found in this group of statutes, would be rendered
useless if it were afforded the same interpretation. To obviate this undesirable result, it is believed the courts would clothe the second phrase
with a general meaning different from that attaching to the specifically
enumerated articles. In Mason v. United States,2 ° the court stated that
the rule of ejusdem generis would not be employed to "render general
words meaningless, since that would be to disregard the primary rule
that effect should be given to every part of a statute, if legitimately possible, and that the words of a statute or other document are to be taken
according to their natural meaning." '21 If then, the specific words are
sufficiently comprehensive to exhaust the genus and leave nothing essentially similar upon which the general words may operate, there would be
22
no room for application of the doctrine.
19 See Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, Vol. 2, Ch. 48, § 217; Conn. Gen. Stats, 1949, Vol. 3,
Ch. 423, § 8567; Dela. Laws 1941, Ch. 239, p. 1018, amending Rev. Code 1935, Ch.
153, § 32; Kans. Gen. Stats. 1935, Ch. 21, § 2110; Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann. 1939,
Tit. 18, Ch. 2, § 4524.
20 260 U. S.545, 43 S.Ct. 200, 67 L. Ed. 396 (1923).
21260 U. S. 545 at 554, 43 S.Ct. 200 at 202, 67 L. Ed. 396 at 399.
22 See also United States v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 26, 30 S. Ct. 19, 54 L. Ed. 77
(1909) ; Arizona Sulphur Mining Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ariz. 64, 262 P. 489 (1927) ;
Schleman v. Guaranty Title Co., 153 Fla. 379, 15 So. (2d) 754 (1944); Phelps v.
Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 318, 272 S. W. 743 (1925); Utica State Say. Bank v.
Village of Oak Park, 279 Mich. 568, 273 N. W. 271 (1937) ; Stall v. Frank Electric
Co., 289 Mo. 25, 240 S.W. 245 (1922) ; Gates v. Chandler, 174 Miss. 815, 165 So. 442
(1936) ; State v. Wells, 146 Oh4o St. 131, 64 N. E. (2d) 593 (1946) ; Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 38 Okla. 233, 132 P. 908 (1913) ; Knoxtenn Theatres
v. McConless, 177 Tenn. 497, 151 S. W. (2d) 164 (1941) ; State v. Savidge, 144
Wash. 302, 258 P. 1 (1927).
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Does it follow, however, that under statutes in this category obscene
phonograph records can be said to lie within the broad generic terms of
"article" or "instrument."
The New York court, in the instant case,
disposing of a contention by the state that the information had been drawn
under a second clause in the New York statute identical to the phrase
hereunder consideration, indicated that a phonograph record could become an "article of indecent or immoral use" when it served to reproduce
an indecent song or conversation. It did, however, properly refuse to rule
on the point after it reached the conclusion that the information had not
been framed under this clause of the statute. The dictum displays a
judicial attitude favorable toward the inclusion of phonograph records
within the term "article," and there is a magistrate 's decision in New
York which does so hold. 23 A similar holding would seem proper under
the sectional provision of the Kentucky statute, 24 where reference is specifically made to articles and instruments of indecent or immoral use or
purpose, as well as to such generic terms as "article" and "instrument."
In the final category of statutes, 25 while there is a specific enumeration
given to articles falling within the genus of obscene articles which serve
to communicate their obscenity to the mind by the sense of sight, reference is also made to an "instrument or article of immoral use or purpose," but the connecting phrase such as "any," "or any," or "or any
other" is conspicuous by its absence. As the presence of such linking
terms appears to be a condition precedent to the operation of the rule
ejusdern generis, it may be argued that the general phrase so found therein
could be construed to include articles whose obscenity exists more in their
use than in the presentation of the offensive matter to one's sight. It is
believed that the absence of the general words reflects an intention on the
part of the legislature to make this phrase refer to one of an enumerated
class of obscene articles but to leave its meaning unencumbered, that is to
possess a general meaning not to be drawn into assimilation with the other
specifically enumerated species. Only the Illinois statute, one of this
class, appears to have been subjected to an interpretative decision. In
Lanteen Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark,26 the Illinois Appellate Court of its
own motion took notice that the contract submitted to it for specific performance was tainted with illegality in that it called for the indiscriminate sale of contraceptives through drug stores, thereby involving the
People ex rel. Kahan v. Jaffe, 178 Misc. 523, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 104 (1942).
Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 436, § 436.090.
25 D. C. Code 1940, Tit. 22, § 2001; Ili. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 468;
Burns' Ind. Stats. Ann. 1933, Vol. 4, Ch. 28, § 10-2803; Wyo. Comp. Stats. Ann.
1945, Vol. 1, Ch. 9, § 9-513.
26 294 Ill. App. 81, 13 N. E. (2d) 678 (1938).
23

24
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sale of an "article of indecent or immoral use." It can hardly be contended that contraceptives are articles wherein the obscenity is communicated to the mind merely by the presentation of the article to sight.
Rather, it is the use thereof which becomes offensive to public morality.
While interpretation of statutes in this category remains a matter of
question because of lack of sufficient judicial construction on which to
base an adequate opinion, it is believed that such interpretation should
include articles which are not of the same kind as those specifically
enumerated. Decisions of that character would attribute sense and meaning to the added language. While judicial legislation should always be
guarded against, judicial throttling of legislative intention is equally
undesirable.
It would appear, then, that many states, because of narrow statutory
language, are ill-equipped to punish persons who mock at public morality
by the production and sale of obscene phonograph records. Others, by
sufficiently comprehensive statutory terminology, at least when aided by
proper judicial interpretation, have made it possible to punish those who
would produce and traffic in illicit instrumentalities of the type here
considered. Against the possibility of doubt arising in such cases, close
scrutiny of existing legislation would seem desirable and some revision
appears essential.
F. L. JOHNSON

